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Abstract
This paper explores the motivations behind giving. Speci￿cally,
it focuses on personal involvement and responsibility to explain why
decision makers give positive amounts in dictatorial decisons. The
experiment is designed to uncover these motivations. Subjects face
the problem of a dictator￿ s allocation of an indivisible pie P to one of
two players; indivisibility creates an extremely unequal outcome and
the dictator is given a chance to correct this outcome at a cost. The
willingness to pay to correct the outcome is examined under di⁄erent
scenarios so that we learn about several features concerning prefer-
ences.
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11 Motivation
Recent experimental literature has interpreted giving in dictator game (DG
hereafter) in terms of fairness-based preferences (see Camerer, 2003, chap.
2). Nevertheless, experimental studies such as Ho⁄man et al. [12] & [13],
Dana et al. [7] & [8], Lazear, Malmendier & Weber [14] have questioned
this interpretation. According to these studies some dictators do not share
their endowments just because their preferences are other-regarding. Giving
in DG could be in￿ uenced by self-centered reasons. For instance, by social
reputation, by the level of ￿transparency￿of the mapping between dictators￿
decisions and outcomes, or as a result of feeling ￿guilt￿or ￿shame￿for not
giving.
This paper aims to provide a better understanding of self-regarding mo-
tives behind giving in DG. Our hypothesis is that sel￿sh allocations in DG
may have a moral cost attached for decision makers. Under fairness con-
cerns, this moral cost is to be understood as emerging from agents feeling
uncomfortable with (too) unequal results. However, the moral cost attached
to a dictator￿ s sel￿sh decision may be related not only to the nature of the
result, but to the very action of making the decision. In other words, pangs
of conscience do not only arise from the fact that dictators￿sel￿sh decisions
bring about an unequal distribution of payo⁄s; they may be largely the result
of dictators being responsible for and bene￿ciaries of unfair decisions.
As Dana, Weber & Xi Kuang [8] point out, there might be a restriction
of self-interest in dictatorial allocations that is context-driven rather than
arising from a desire for a fair outcome. In this regard, our main hypothesis
is the following:
For a given unfair payo⁄ distribution, giving decreases when the moral
cost attached to decisions is reduced.
To analyze this hypothesis, we have designed an experiment in which a
decision maker faces the problem of allocating an indivisible pie P to one
of two players. Indivisibility creates an extremely unequal outcome. Then,
taking this unequal outcome as a starting point, the agent is given the chance
to correct the distribution at a cost. The willingness to incur this cost is
examined under a series of scenarios di⁄ering in the moral costs attached to
decision-making.
The benchmark allocation problem is an all￿ or￿ nothing dictator game
(DGan hereafter). In a standard DG, the task of subject i is to allocate a
￿pie￿ , P, between a recipient j and himself/herself; that is, he/she has to
2decide his/her payo⁄, ￿i; and, thus, his/her recipient￿ s, ￿j = P ￿ ￿i. We
modify this standard version of the dictator game by making P indivisible
(see a similar approach in Bolton, Katok & Zwick [2] and Braæas￿ Garza [4]1).
Thus, as Figure 1 shows, the subjects￿Decision 1 in the DGan is reduced to
just two possible allocations: (￿i;￿j) = (P;0) if i chooses strategy s1, and
(￿i;￿j) = (0;P) if he/she opts for s2.
Figure 1: The All-or-Nothing





   (1)
Subjects are therefore confronted with the dilemma of either keeping the
whole pie for themselves or adopting a purely altruistic behavior in which
the recipient receives the entire pie.
Following the standard sel￿sh behavior assumption, let us suppose that
subjects choose strategy s1, giving rise to an unequal payo⁄ distribution
in which they keep the whole pie for themselves. Dictators are then given
the opportunity to amend the distribution resulting from their decision. In
particular, using part of the pie they got in Decision 1 of this DGan, they
are given the chance to pay something in order to give a new, whole pie to
their recipient. To elicit the willingness to pay of individual i (wtpi, where
i = 1;:::;n, and n is the number of individuals), a standard payment card is
used.
If the average willingness to pay is positive, \ WTP = 1
n
P
i wtpi > 0, this
would mean that agents, on average, are ready to sacri￿ce part of their own
payo⁄ to improve recipients￿welfare. Note in this regard that if subject i
reveals a positive willingness to pay (wtpi > 0), then, ￿i < ￿j. The reason is
that i would be sacri￿cing part of P to give a new, whole pie to j; that is, the
1In Bolton, Katok & Zwick [2], dictators always receive at least a ￿xed prize. In our
design, as in Braæas-Garza [4], they have to decide whether they get the whole pie or
nothing.
3payo⁄distribution would become (￿i;￿j) = (P￿wtpi;P) instead of (￿i;￿j) =
(P;0). In other words, agents would have accepted a disadvantageous type
of inequity to mitigate the extreme advantageous inequity that resulted from
choosing s1 in Decision 1.
Our experiment, as discussed below, produces the result that the average
willingness to pay in the DGan is positive. Among the di⁄erent explanations
economic theory provides for this result, three are particularly relevant.2
1st explanation: Inequity aversion (ia)
De￿nition 1 (ia) Individuals are inequity averse when ￿they are willing to
give up some material payo⁄ to move in the direction of more equitable out-
comes￿(Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, p. 819).
With this de￿nition at hand, the observed \ WTP > 0 may be explained
as the result of subjects￿attempts to reduce the (advantageous) extreme
inequity generated as a result of choosing s1 in Decision 1.
Nevertheless, note that wtpi > 0 also means that subject i is ready to
accept a disadvantageous inequity.
2nd explanation: E¢ ciency gains (eg)
De￿nition 2 (eg) Subjects are e¢ ciency seekers if they care about the sum
of individual payo⁄s.
In line with this de￿nition, e¢ ciency gains are a possible explanation for
\ WTP > 0, because the correction of the initial decision in the DGan involves
an increase in the sum of payo⁄s. That is, for subject ith, [(P ￿wtpi)+P] >
[P + 0].
3rd explanation: Social game attributes
Andreoni & Miller [1] emphasize the context of the game. In particular, they
de￿ne a vector ￿ of attributes of a game, which would include aspects such
as social variables, the rules of the game or its framing.
2Besides these three explanations, theoretical models sometimes include reciprocity as
an explanation for cooperative behavior (see Charness & Rabin [6]). For instance, in
repeated games, the fear of punishment induce subjects to be kind. In the problem stated
in Figure 1 there is clearly no room for reciprocity.
4In terms of subject i￿ s utility function, this view implies that agent i faces
a utility function as follows:
ui(x;￿),
where x = (xi;xj) is a feasible allocation of resources (the sum of payo⁄s
is equal to or lower than the total amount available, xi + xj 6 X) and
￿ is a vector of attributes describing the relevant features of the process
generating the allocation. That is, subjects may care not only about the
￿nal consequences of their decisions but also about other aspects such as the
means of achieving the ￿nal outcome.
In this paper we consider two dimensions of ￿. Both are related to the
possibility of Decision 1 having some moral cost attached to it.
The ￿rst dimension of ￿ we consider is ￿1, personal involvement in allo-
cations.
De￿nition 3 (￿1) A subject has personal involvement in an allocation, ￿1,
when he/she obtains advantage directly and personally from the payo⁄ dis-
tribution.
Subjects may incur a ￿1-type moral cost when they have to decide on an
allocation where all their earnings are recipients￿losses. A standard example
of this type of decision is DG, where each unit of the pie the dictator keeps
for himself/herself is at the expense of the other player.
If individuals do not like to adopt Decision 1 shown in Figure 1 because
they bene￿t directly from it at the expense of the recipient￿ s payo⁄, then
a positive \ WTP could be explained in terms of the moral attribute of the
game ￿1.
The second relevant dimension of ￿ is subjects￿personal responsibility for
decisions, ￿2.
De￿nition 4 (￿2) Subjects are responsible for a decision when they have
control over the results of the decision.
If subjects feel responsible for making a decision, they incur the cost (or
have the bene￿t) attached to being directly responsible for the results of
that decision. Note that the nature of the e⁄ect depends on whether it is a
pleasant or unpleasant decision.
5In the case of the DGan, ￿2 may adopt the particular form of subjects
feeling responsible for an extremely unequal outcome. As a result, when they
are o⁄ered the opportunity to remedy this situation, they agree to pay to
modify the distribution.
In the light of these de￿nitions, our previous hypothesis can now be for-
mulated as follows:
Hypothesis All￿ or￿ nothing dictatorial-type decisions are a⁄ected by the
attributes of the game. In particular, for a given unfair distribution of
payo⁄s, when the presence of ￿1and ￿2 is reduced or canceled, giving
decreases.
Note that ￿1and ￿2 make reference to the ￿moral dimension￿of decisions;
that is, to their ￿right￿or ￿wrong￿nature. However, these two variables
are not only related to the moral nature of the outcome but also to the
characteristics of the very action of making decisions. Accordingly, this moral
dimension refers not only to one￿ s decisions being detrimental to others; i.e.,
it is not only other-regarding but also self-centered. This implies that, if the
hypothesis above is correct, a decision which is equally detrimental to others
may have attached to it a lower moral cost for the decision maker when
he/she does not feel guilty for his/her role in the decision-making process.
In our setup, there are guilt feelings when the decision maker bene￿ts from
the decision and/or feels responsible for the decision.
The following section describes the di⁄erent treatments used to analyze
this hypothesis and the conditions in which the experiments were conducted.
2 Experimental design and procedures
2.1 All or nothing decisions
We ran four treatments to explore this conjecture. Table 1 provides a sum-
mary of the ￿rst three Treatment 4 will be discussed in Section 5.
All-or-Nothing Dictator Game (T1): This all-or-nothing dictator game
(DGan hereafter) is the control treatment. The decision task of decision
makers in this treatment is to allocate an indivisible pie, P, of 10
experimental currency units (ECUs) as shown in Figure 1. Subjects
act as dictators, and their recipients are students randomly chosen from
6the class list. Note that both strategies s1 and s2 in Decision 1 give rise
to extreme distributions because the 10 ECU pie is not divisible; that
is, agents can only generate an extremely unequal payo⁄ distribution.
After this inequity is created, they are given the opportunity without
previous announcement to balance the payo⁄distribution by incurring
a cost to give a new, whole pie to their recipient. To elicit subjects￿
willingness to pay, a standard payment card is used.
The payment card gives subjects the chance to pay part of their endow-
ment to give a whole, new 10 ECU pie to the recipient. That is, if agents
choose s1 in Decision 1, as may be expected, this payment card gives them
the opportunity to nearly balance the distribution of ￿nal payo⁄s (see Ap-
pendix 1 for the instructions concerning the payment cards in T1, T2 and
T3).
Table 1: Treatments and Decision 1
recipient 1 recipient 2 Feasible Payoffs
DGan T1 dictator classmate (10;0) (0;10)
ADan T2 classmate classmate (10;0) (0;10)
ADrandom T3 classmate classmate (10;0) (0;10) Random
All-or-Nothing Allocation Decision (T2): In this scenario, subjects have
to assign a 10 ECU indivisible pie in Decision 1; but they do not di-
rectly bene￿t from this all-or-nothing allocation decision (ADan here-
after). That is, the task is to allocate the indivisible pie between two
classmates.3 Nevertheless, although individuals do not obtain advan-
tage from their decision, they do earn a 10 ECU show￿ up fee. This
show-up fee will be used to make subjects reveal their willingness to
pay to give a new, whole 10 ECU pie to the recipient who got a zero
payo⁄in Decision 1. Note that the only di⁄erence between T1 and T2 is
the decision maker￿ s personal involvement in the payo⁄s of an unequal
allocation decision; that is, ￿1 in￿ uences subjects￿decision making in
T1, but it does not do so in T2.
3In a certain sense, this ADan is reminiscent of Solomon￿ s dilemma (see Ponti [15] and
Ponti et al. [16]).
7All-or-Nothing Allocation Decision with Random Lever (T3): This
all-or-nothing allocation decision with random lever (ADrandom here-
after) is identical to T2, except that subjects have three options in
Decision 1: s1, s2 and what we call ￿Random Lever￿ . Choosing the
latter option implies that agents delegate their decision to a lever which
selects strategies s1 and s2 randomly. Thus, those subjects who choose
the random lever might feel they withdraw control over the payo⁄ dis-
tribution. If this were the case, ￿2 would not in￿ uence their decision;
that is, even if recipients are chosen randomly from the class list, the
decision makers￿feeling of responsibility for the resulting unequal dis-
tribution may be reduced.4
2.2 Procedures
Experimental sessions were conducted among Economics students taking Mi-
croeconomics 1 (four sections) at the University of Granada (Spain). This
course is taught during the spring semester of the ￿rst year. The total sample
comprises 112 subjects divided into four treatments (for the distribution of
subjects by treatments see Tables 3 and 5).
Following an unrelated survey, subjects faced the allocation decisions de-
scribed in Table 1, named Decision 1. Recipients were chosen randomly from
the class list. There were four sessions (one for each section of the course),
and all were conducted the same day in March 2005. In each of these four
sessions at least two treatments were conducted, but each subject played
only one treatment, i.e. each subject faced just one allocation decision. No
subject had any information regarding the game other subjects were playing.
After facing Decision 1, subjects were asked how much they would pay
to give a new, whole pie to the recipient who did not get anything. They did
not know in advance they would face this second decision. To elicit the wtpi
of agent i we used a standard payment card5 whose instructions are shown
in Appendix 1.
The payo⁄rules adopted aimed at creating a very competitive context. In
this sense, subjects were informed that the number of points obtained during
the experimental session (jointly with the points in other four experimental
4For a di⁄erent way of analyzing the consequences of di⁄used responsibility, see Dana,
Weber & Xi Kuang [8].
5To induce subjects to reveal their true willingness to pay, they were informed that
only one randomly chosen row would be e⁄ective.
8sessions in which they would participate during the course6) would modify
the ￿nal grade of the course in the following way. Each of the 4 sections of the
course plays a di⁄erent tournament. The winner in each class receives three
points (out of ten) to be added to the ￿nal grade. Other subjects￿grades
depend on how close their performance is to the winner￿ s.
Note that paying with grade points implies that there is no possibility of
ex post exchange and provides strong enough incentives for students.
2.3 Subjects￿opinion
After running the experiment, we asked subjects about their motivations.
The aim was to compare subjects￿opinions to our conjectures that their de-
cisions would be driven by personal involvement and responsibility. We asked
21 subjects (a complete section of the course) out of the whole sample to ￿ll a
questionnaire. The questionnaire was given a week after the experiment was
conducted; at that point, we had not yet provided any information to any of
the participants about the objectives of the experiment or about preliminary
results. The questionnaire consisted of three parts, as discussed below.
3 The role of ￿1 in dictatorial choices
Now we explore how inequity aversion (ia), e¢ ciency gains (eg), personal
involvement in allocations (￿1) and responsibility for the decision (￿1) a⁄ect
individual decisions in treatments T1, T2 and T3. Table 2 summarizes the
relevant features for each treatment.
Table 2: Treatment Summary
Treatments Variables
T1 DGan ia eg ￿1 ￿2
T2 ADan ia eg ￿2
T3 ADrandom* ia eg
*Only for individuals who made use of the random lever.
6The sequence was as follows: a dictator game (March), GRE maths test (beginning
of April), risk aversion tests (end of April), and travelers￿dilemma (June).
9Table 3 presents the relevant results for T1, T2 and T3. Recall that we
use the DGan as a control treatment. Row 1 in Table 3 refers to subjects
who play strategy s1 in this treatment.7 Speci￿cally, it shows the mean
and the frequency distribution of these subjects￿willingness to pay to give a
new 10 ECU pie to their respective recipients. On average, decision makers
are willing to pay 2:69. In addition, 82% of individuals are willing to pay a
positive amount of ECUs to modify the extremely unequal payo⁄distribution
resulting from s1.
Result 1: After facing Decision 1 in the DGan, 82% of subjects show a pos-
itive willingness to pay to balance the distribution. In this treatment,
\ WTP > 0 is the result of the joint e⁄ect of ia, eg, ￿1 and ￿2.
The relative importance of each of these four variables cannot be assessed
in the DGan. The ADan and the ADrandom are designed to uncover the e⁄ect
of ￿1 and ￿2.
Table 3: Main Results in T1, T2 & T3
Frequency
n Mean 0 1 2 3 4 5+
DGan (T1) 27 2:69 5(18%) 2(7%) 4(14%) 5(18%) 7(25%) 4(14%)
ADan (T2) 36 1:72 13(36%) 4(11%) 6(16%) 6(16%) 7(19%) 0(0%)
ADrandom (T3) 11 0:73 5(45%) 5(45%) 0(0%) 1(9%) 0(0%) 0(0%)
ADNrandom (T3) 12 1:58 4(33%) 2(17%) 3(25%) 1(8%) 2(17%) 0(0%)
First, we compare DGan data with data from ADan. The di⁄erence be-
tween the tasks in these two treatments is that decision makers do not bene￿t
directly from their decisions in the latter and therefore ￿1 could not possibly
in￿ uence them. In this regard, individuals￿willingness to pay decreases to
1:72 on average when ￿1 is not present, i.e. when the decision maker is not
involved in the payo⁄ allocations.
Moreover, the percentage of subjects who are not ready to pay anything
to reverse the results obtained from s1 in the ADan doubles the percentage
72 subjects out of 29 chose s2 in the DGan.
10observed in DGan (36% vs. 18%). That is, the percentage of people willing
to pay a positive amount falls to 64%.
Another surprising result is that 14% of subjects in the DGan are ready
to pay half of the pie, whereas none of the participants in the ADan reveals
such a high willingness to pay. Using the Mann-Whitney test to compare
the distributions of the two treatments (Z = ￿1:92; p = 0:05), the null is
rejected; i.e., these distributions are not drawn from the same population.
Hence, comparing the results of the DGan and the ADan we have:
Result 2: When ￿1 is removed, \ WTP decreases from 2:69 in the DGan to
1:72 in the ADan.
Therefore, we can conclude:
Result 3: There is a positive causal relationship between ￿1 and subjects￿
wtp.
Now, we explore subjects￿opinion regarding ￿1. We explained to the
21 participants in the questionnaire the basic features of a standard DG.
In addition, we gave a brief introduction on how subjects￿decisions in this
type of game may con￿ ict with the standard hypothesis of utility maximiza-
tion. Then we described our experiment￿ s benchmark ￿ i.e. the DGan￿and
reminded individuals how the payment card worked.
Finally, we told individuals that the average willingness to pay in the
DGan they had participated in was positive; in particular that \ WTP = 2:69.
We added that a priory this could be due to four di⁄erent variables and asked
subjects to order them according to their capability to explain this positive
sign of \ WTP.
The four variables we proposed and the way we de￿ned them in the
questionnaire were as follows:8
1. Efficiency (eg): To make the sum of all players￿payo⁄s as high as
possible.
2. Inequity Aversion (ia): A large di⁄erence between those who get
the highest payo⁄ and those who get the lowest is annoying.
8The four variables are shown in the same order in which they appeared on the test
sheet.
113. Conscience (￿1): To gain something, someone else has to lose; that
is, I bene￿t from someone else￿ s loss.
4. Hard Decision (hd): Decisions to be made are of the all-or-nothing
type; that is, I cannot choose intermediate distributions.
Note that the ￿conscience￿variable corresponds to ￿1; i.e., whether de-
cision makers modify their wtp as a result of their personal involvement.
The ￿hard decision￿variable is just the main di⁄erence between standard
DGs and our DGan. The remaining two variables (￿e¢ ciency￿and ￿inequity
aversion￿ ) are as de￿ned above (see section 1).
Table 4 shows the main results regarding subjects￿ranking.
Table 4: Subjects￿Ranking of Giving Motivations in DGan
Ranking 1st Ranking 2nd Ranking 3rd Ranking 4th
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
￿1 12(57%) ia 10(48%) eg 10(48%) hd 7(33%)
hd 4(19%) hd 5(24%) hd 5(24%) eg 6(29%)
ia 3(14%) ￿1 3(14%) ia 4(19%) ￿1 4(19%)
eg 2(10%) eg 3(14%) ￿1 2(9%) ia 4(19%)
According to this Table, 12 subjects (i.e., 57% of the 21 participants in
the questionnaire) considered ￿conscience￿as the main motivation behind
\ WTP > 0. Hence, subjects￿ranking provides some support for Result 3:
self-regarding moral costs ￿ speci￿cally, ￿1￿play a role in dictatorial decisions.
Although we will return to this below, note also that subjects￿ranking
suggests that inequity aversion and e¢ ciency gains do not seem to be as
important as ￿1. The role of the ￿hard decision￿variable in subjects￿mo-
tivation is not as clear: 9 subjects ranked it ￿rst or second and 12 subjects
ranked it third or fourth.
4 The role of ￿2 in dictatorial choices
As Table 3 shows, \ WTP is positive in the ADan: its value is 1:72. Hence,
it can be stated that personal involvement, ￿1, is relevant, but it cannot
entirely explain the level of \ WTP in all-or-nothing allocation tasks.
12Let us turn our attention to ￿2. To check whether feeling responsible
for an unkind decision has any in￿ uence on wtp we designed T3 such that
subjects face the same decision as in the ADan, but they have the chance
to avoid the allocation decision through a random device. Opting for this
device is like ￿tossing a coin￿to solve King Solomon￿ s dilemma and ￿the
coin￿is who decides how to allocate the pie. In T3, Decision 1 does not
a⁄ect subjects￿payo⁄s (i.e. ￿1 is absent) and our conjecture is that choosing
the random option may help them mitigate their feeling of responsibility for
the resulting allocation (i.e. for those subjects who choose the random lever,
￿2 has little or no in￿ uence).
In row 3 of Table 3, ADrandom refers to those subjects who had the random
device available in T3 and chose it. Almost half of the subjects (11 out of
23) opted for it. However, the other side of the coin is that 12 out of 23
subjects did not use it (ADNrandom in row 4, Table 3). There are two opposing
explanations for this choice. First, individuals who did not choose the random
option do not care about the role of responsibility in their decision. Second,
they do not feel that their responsibility could be removed by choosing the
random lever.
Interestingly, the \ WTP in the ADNrandom matches that obtained in the
ADan (1:79 vs. 1:58). Furthermore, the Mann-Whitney test does not reject
(Z = ￿0:22; p = 0:82) the hypothesis that data arising from the ADan and
the ADNrandom are drawn from the same population. These statistical results
seem to suggest that subjects who did not choose the random option when it
was available perceived the problem they faced in the same way as those in
the ADan perceived theirs ￿ where the allocation decision was the same, but
the randomization device was absent. Therefore, these results provide some
support for the second explanation above: decision makers in the ADNrandom
did not believe that choosing the randomization device would prevent them
from feeling responsible for the unequal distribution.
By contrast, the Mann-Whitney test shows (Z = ￿1:73; p = 0:08) that
data arising from the ADan and the ADrandom are not drawn from the same
population. In addition, as Table 3 shows, the mean in the ADrandom is one
point lower than in the ADan. In particular, \ WTP in the ADrandom decreases
to 0:73. In sum:
Result 4:
(i) When the random option was available, 11 subjects out of 23 made use of
13it. For those subjects who did not use the random option \ WTP = 1:58,
close to \ WTP = 1:79 in the ADan. However, for the subjects who
did use the random lever, \ WTP = 0:73, statistically di⁄erent from
\ WTP = 1:79 in the ADan.
(ii) For half the decision makers in T3 the random device did not remove
subjects￿responsibility. Consequently, the presence of random levers
does not a⁄ect their wtp. However, for those subjects who chose the
random device, ￿2 does play a role in all-or-nothing dictatorial deci-
sions.
We reach the following conclusion:
Result 5: There is a positive causal relation between ￿2 and subjects￿wtp.
Concerning subjects￿opinion about ￿2, the main features of treatment
T3 were brie￿ y explained to the participants in the questionnaire given after
conducting the experiment. We underlined that this treatment was an all-
or-nothing allocation decision and, for the sake of clarity, we compared the
random option to the chance to solve King Solomon￿ s dilemma by tossing a
coin.
Next, we told the participants in the questionnaire that the average WTP
was lower in the ADrandom (\ WTP ADrandom = 0:73) than in the ADNrandom and
in the ADan (\ WTP ADNrandom = 1:58 and \ WTP ADan = 1:72). Then we asked
subjects their opinion about the motivations for the \ WTP decrease when
the random lever was chosen.
Nine subjects out of 21 (i.e. 43%) did not provide a clear conjecture for
the decrease in \ WTP. Two of them pointed out that decision makers do
not care about who receives the 10 ECU pie. One individual argued that
choosing the random lever does not change the resulting payo⁄ distribution:
whether the random option is chosen or not, someone still loses.9
However, 12 subjects out of 21 (i.e. 57%) made explicit reference to the
lower level or lack of responsibility in the resulting payo⁄distribution as the
main cause for the reduction in \ WTP when the random option was chosen.
This result is in line with our conjecture that giving is a⁄ected by ￿2.
9Six subjects provided ￿unclassi￿able￿answers. They made reference to reasons such
as risk aversion, increase in the probability of being wrong, distrust in random choices, or
being in equilibrium.
14The conclusion of the above discussion is that the social attributes of
games are relevant in dictatorial decisions (see Results 3 and 5). Speci￿cally,
in extremely unequal situations there seems to be a positive link between
agents￿willingness to pay to reverse inequity and the self-regarding moral
costs attached to being responsible for and bene￿tting from unfair decisions.
Indeed, after controlling for the e⁄ect of both ￿1 and ￿2 in all-or-nothing
allocation decisions, the average willingness to pay to balance the outcome
decreases. However, it still has a positive value in the ADrandom (\ WTP =
0:73). In accordance with the description of treatments in Table 2, this
positive value could be due to the joint e⁄ect of inequity aversion (ia) and
e¢ ciency gains (eg).
Going back to the questionnaire given to the experimental subjects, as
Table 4 shows, only 3 participants in the questionnaire (i.e. 14% of the 21
subjects) ranked the capability of inequity aversion in ￿rst place to explain
\ WTP = 2:69 in the DGan. However, 13 subjects (62%) ranked this variable
￿rst or second. It could be stated, therefore, that the subjects￿opinion is not
conclusive on the importance to be assigned to inequity aversion as regards
decision makers￿wtp to balance the payo⁄ distribution in this treatment.
Concerning the in￿ uence e¢ ciency gains may exert over \ WTP in DGan,
Table 4 shows that only 5 participants in the questionnaire (i.e. 24% of the
21 participants) ranked e¢ ciency gains in ￿rst and second place when they
were asked about the motivations for \ WTP = 2:69 in DGan. This suggests
that e¢ ciency gains do not play a major role in subjects￿wtp.10
To extend the analysis of how guilt feelings may in￿ uence decisions in the
next section we explore a scenario where, after making Decision 1, subjects
may avoid the resulting uneasiness by exiting the game.
5 Further evidence: Please, let me out!
This section presents the results of treatment T4. In this treatment, we
elicit subjects￿willingness to pay to avoid the discomfort of having to make
Decision 1. Here, in contrast to treatments T1, T2 and T3 where subjects
10Note that \ WTP = 2:69 in the DGan is very similar to the results of other standard
DGs where there are no e¢ ciency gains. For instance, it is quite close to the 2:5 average
giving of dictators in the standard single-room DG in Frohlich, Oppenheimer & Moore
[11].
15could correct the unequal outcome, it is Decision 1 itself that can be removed
at a cost for the decision maker.11
All-or-Nothing Dictator Game with Exit Option (T4): Decision 1 is
the same in this all-or-nothing dictator game with exit option (DGexit
hereafter) and in the DGan. The di⁄erence between the two treatments
is that in the DGexit, after making Decision 1 and without previous an-
nouncement, subjects are o⁄ered the possibility of exiting the game.12
Leaving the game renders Decision 1 invalid. Whether this exit option
is free or not depends on agents￿preferences. A payment card (see
Appendix 2) is used to elicit their willingness to pay to cancel Decision
1 and exit the game.
Thus, the DGexit analyzes how much agents are ready to pay in exchange
for exiting the game and canceling their previous decision.
Table 5 shows \ WTP in T1, T2, T3 and T4,13 and whether or not the
inequity aversion (ia), e¢ ciency gains (eg), involvement in payments (￿1) and
responsibility for decisions (￿2) variables are present in these four treatments.
Subjects accept 8:91 on average to cancel Decision 1 and exit the game. In
other words, the average amount of ECUs they are ready to give up to exit
the game is 10 ￿ 8:91 = 1:09.
Table 5: Treatments
n Mean
DGan (T1) ia eg ￿1 ￿2 27 2:69
ADan (T2) ia eg ￿2 36 1:72
ADrandom (T3) ia eg 11 0:73
DGexit (T4) ia ￿1 ￿2 22 1:09
As Table 5 shows, the variables which may in￿ uence the outcome in the
DGexit are inequity aversion (ia), dictators￿personal involvement in payments
(￿1) and their responsibility for unkind decisions (￿2). Note that there are no
11T4 was conducted under the procedures described in Section 2.2 and in the same
sessions as T1, T2 and T3.
12For this type of approach, see Dana, Cain & Dawes [7], and Lazear, Ulrike & Weber
[14].
13As in the DGan, arguments focus on individuals who chose s1 in Decision 1. Only 2
out of 24 subjects did not choose this strategy in the DGexit.
16e¢ ciency gains (eg) in this treatment. As a matter of fact, when wtpi > 0 in
the DGexit, the payo⁄ distribution becomes (￿i;￿j) = (P ￿ wtpi;0) instead
of (￿i;￿j) = (P;0); that is, agent i su⁄ers an individual loss for exiting the
game which also involves an e¢ ciency loss.
We have argued in this paper that what may sometimes appear as inequity
aversion is in fact moral discomfort for having been involved in making a
decision with unequal consequences or for having bene￿tted from it. The
DGexit provides additional support for this result. Assume that moral costs
have no in￿ uence; then, \ WTP = 1:09 in the DGexit would imply that the
parameter which measures the utility loss from advantageous inequity in Fehr
& Schmidt￿ s [10] utility function is larger than 1 for some individuals. That
is, if subject i￿ s wtpi is positive, then, ￿i > 1.14 Fehr and Schmidt [10] rejects
this possibility: if ￿i = 1,
... then player i is prepared to throw away one dollar in order
to reduce his advantage relative to player j which seems very im-
plausible. This is why we do not consider the case ￿i > 1 (Fehr
& Schmidt, 1999, p. 824).
Indeed, stating that our experimental subjects were ready to throw grade
points away to reduce their advantageous position in the experiment￿ s results
does not seem to make too much sense. Given that ￿i > 1 seems an implau-
sible parameter value in terms of inequity aversion preferences, this variable
by itself is not able to rationalize subjects￿behavior in DGexit.
14Fehr & Schmidt￿ s [10] utility function of inequity aversion is the following:











where ui(x) is the utility function of player i; x = x1;:::;xn is the vector of monetary
payo⁄s; n is the number of players; ￿i is the sensitivity of individual i0s utility to dis-
advantageous inequity; and ￿i is the sensitivity of individual i￿ s utility to advantageous
inequity. Since \ WTP = 1:09, some subjects have a positive willingness to pay. Assume
i is one of them, then, he/she prefers a payo⁄ distribution where (￿i;￿j) = (P ￿ wtpi;0)
than a distribution where (￿i;￿j) = (P;0) = (10;0). In terms of Fehr & Schmidt￿ s utility
function, this means that:
(P ￿ wtpi) ￿ ￿i0 ￿ ￿i maxf(P ￿ wtpi) ￿ 0;0g > 10 ￿ ￿i0 ￿ ￿i maxf10 ￿ 0g:
That is, ￿i > 1:
17Thus:
Result 6: In DGexit, subjects are willing to give a positive payo⁄ (1:09 on
average) to avoid the moral costs (￿1 and ￿2) attached to an allocation
decision. Inequity aversion by itself cannot explain this behavior.
An interesting outcome of the DGexit is that subjects are willing to give
up some payo⁄s just to avoid being unkind.15 This behavior could respond to
what can be called the ostrich￿ s strategy. When subjects face an unpleasant
decision they may prefer ￿to hide their head in the sand￿by canceling that
decision even at a cost. Indeed, as Table 6 shows, 86% of the subjects chose
to do so. More surprisingly, about half of them (54%) were ready to sacri￿ce
part of their payo⁄ to prevent their previous decision from being put into
practice.16
Table 6: Main Results in T4
Amount accepted to exit
n Mean Not exit 10 9 8 7
DGexit 22 8:91 3(14%) 7(32%) 4(18%) 4(18%) 4(18%)
We also asked the 21 participants in the questionnaire about the exit
option. In particular, we focused on the following salient result. In the
DGexit, 3 out of 22 decision makers revealed their preference for not exiting
the game; i.e. 14% of the subjects wanted their Decision 1 to be put into
practice, admitting the payo⁄ distribution: (￿i;￿j) = (P;0). Another 7
individuals (i.e. 32%) preferred to exit the game and cancel their previous
decision, but they were not ready to pay anything for exercising this option.
15This result is closely related to Lazear, Malmendier & Weber￿ s [14] statement that
a signi￿cant part of players choose to exit a dictator game even when playing the game
presents potential allocations that strictly Pareto-dominate the exit option. Notwithstand-
ing this relation, our results in the DGexit have to be interpreted in di⁄erent terms than
those of Lazear, Malmendier & Weber￿ s [14]. The reason is that the chance of quitting the
game in our DGexit implies cancelling a decision which results in an extremely unequal
payo⁄ distribution, rather than avoiding an environment which permits sharing.
16In Dana, Cain & Dawes [7], about 30% of the decision makers chose to exit a $10
dictator game in exchange for $9.
18As far as the decision maker￿ s payo⁄ is concerned there is no di⁄erence
between these two decisions: in both of them, he/she gets the whole pie. In
addition, neither of them implies loss of e¢ ciency. Furthermore, inequity is
the same in practice: recipients get zero in both cases. However, there might
be a di⁄erence: when subjects pay nothing for exiting but choose this option,
they might be avoiding ￿2, i.e., their responsibility for the result. In other
words, it could be a clear case of looking the other way.17
To check this, we asked the participants in the questionnaire to answer
which of the following games they prefer:
￿ Game 1: You get 10, your recipient gets 0.
￿ Game 2: You get 10.
Five out of 21 participants in the questionnaire (i.e., 24%) preferred Game
1. These ￿ve participants justi￿ed their decision on sel￿sh terms. The clear-
est argument in this sense is provided by a subject who stated that his/her
reason for choosing Game 1 is that others being worse is good for him/her,
because points for the ￿nal grade are assigned taking as a reference point the
subject who gets the highest payo⁄.
Of the 16 subjects who opted for Game 2, three (14% of the total) inex-
plicably argue as if their payo⁄s were uncertain in Game 1. In the remaining
group of thirteen individuals,18 ￿ve subjects (24% over 21) stated that their
main concern was their own payo⁄ and added that they did not care about
￿the other player￿ s payo⁄￿ . They interpreted Game 2 as if there were a
￿ctitious player and his/her earnings were an unknown quantity. On the
other hand, seven subjects (33%) explicitly stated that choosing Game 2 im-
plies the possibility that the unknown payo⁄ of this second ￿ctitious player
may be positive; that is, they revealed the following preference over payo⁄
distribution: (10;x) ￿ (10;0), where x > 0.
In short, more than half the participants in the questionnaire opted for
Game 2 as a result of assuming that in this game there is a second player
whose payo⁄ is an unknown quantity.
This result may provide some support for our discussion concerning ￿2
and ￿2: agents prefer not to assume responsibility for mean decisions which
17This type of behavior has been called strategic ignorance in the literature (see Dana,
Weber & Xi Kuang [8]): deciding to remain ignorant of the consequences of one￿ s actions.
18One subject in this group just stated that he/she prefers Game 2 because the decision





19they dislike (for instance, giving a zero payo⁄ to his/her recipient for sure)
and this fact is a⁄ecting their wtp.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that the social features of the game, such as responsibility in
decision making and personal involvement in the decisions￿outcomes are rel-
evant in explaining the motivation behind giving in all-or-nothing allocation
decisions.
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227 Appendix 1: Instructions concerning the
payment card in T1, T2 and T3.
At this stage, you have the opportunity to modify your previous decision.19
Unfortunately, this option is not free. If you want to use it, it will cost you
something. This cost will be substracted from your ￿nal payo⁄ (if you wish,
you can check the decision you made before). Let us focus on Decision 1.
Pay attention to the following table. How should you read this table? 1
point means that YOU give up 1 point so that 10 points are given to the
student who got 0 points in your Decision 1; 2 points means that YOU give
up 2 points so that 10 points are given to the student who got 0 points in
your Decision 1, and so on.
Only one of the rows of the table will be put into practice. This row will
be chosen randomly, i.e. by drawing lots. Thus, if in row ten you choose
to pay 10 so that the other student gets 10 points and this row is randomly
selected, we will reduce your ￿nal payo⁄by 10 points and will give 10 points
to the student who got 0 POINTS in your Decision 1.
In each scenario (row), you must mark what you want with a cross. YOU
MUST NOT MARK ￿YES￿AND ￿NO￿IN THE SAME ROW (otherwise,
you will lose everything).
If you give up: We give to the student who
got 0 in your Decision 1:
1 point 10 points Yes ￿ No ￿
2 points 10 points Yes ￿ No ￿
3 points 10 points Yes ￿ No ￿
4 points 10 points Yes ￿ No ￿
5 points 10 points Yes ￿ No ￿
6 points 10 points Yes ￿ No ￿
7 points 10 points Yes ￿ No ￿
8 points 10 points Yes ￿ No ￿
9 points 10 points Yes ￿ No ￿
10 points 10 points Yes ￿ No ￿
19This ￿previous decision￿is Decision 1 in Figure 1. Speci￿cally, it is an all-or-nothing
dictator game in T1; and an all-or-nothing allocation decision in T2 and T3.
238 Appendix 2: Instructions concerning the
payment card in T4.
At this stage, we give you the opportunity TO EXIT THE EXPERIMENT
and thus PREVENT DECISION 1 FROM BEING PUT INTO PRACTICE.
In other words, you can get points without facing an allocation decision.
To put it di⁄erently, we o⁄er you points for not implementing your pre-
vious decision (if you wish, you can check the decision you made before).
To learn how we provide you with this opportunity to exit the experiment,
pay attention to the following table. How should you read this table? If you
choose ￿YES￿ at the level where we o⁄er you 1 point, YOU get 1 point
and your previous decision is not put into practice; if you choose ￿YES￿at
the level where we o⁄er you 2 points, YOU get 2 points and your previous
decision is not put into practice, and so on. Remember that if you choose
"NO" at all levels, your Decision 1 is executed.
Only one of the rows of the table will be put into practice. This row will
be chosen randomly, i.e. by drawing lots. Thus, if you choose ￿YES￿in a
certain row and that row is randomly selected, we will give you the amount
of points corresponding to that row. If you choose ￿NO￿in the randomly
selected row, what you decided in Decision 1 is put into practice.
In each scenario (row), you must mark what you want with a cross. YOU
MUST NOT MARK ￿YES￿AND ￿NO￿IN THE SAME ROW (otherwise,
you will lose everything).
If we o⁄er you: You agree to exit:
1 point Yes ￿ No ￿
2 points Yes ￿ No ￿
3 points Yes ￿ No ￿
4 points Yes ￿ No ￿
5 points Yes ￿ No ￿
6 points Yes ￿ No ￿
7 points Yes ￿ No ￿
8 points Yes ￿ No ￿
9 points Yes ￿ No ￿
10 points Yes ￿ No ￿
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